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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with detection of flooding attacks which are the most common type of Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks in a Mobile Agent World. We propose a new framework for the detection of flooding attacks by 
integrating Divergence measures over Sketch data structure. The performance of the proposed framework is 
investigated in terms of detection probability and false alarm ratio. We focus on tuning the parameter of 
Divergence Measures to optimize the performance. We conduct performance analysis over publicly available 
real IP traces, in Mobile Agent Network, integrated with flooding attacks. Our analysis results prove that our 
proposed algorithm outperforms the existing solutions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are designed using independent, autonomous known as agents which can 
perform their tasks independently or collectively in different types of environments [2]. The agents can 
be considered as processes with the ability to perform an action on the environment on behalf of user 
[32]. These systems allow distribution of complex tasks amongst agents. One of the basic properties of 
multi-agent system is its ability of self-organization which makes it utterly desirable for autonomous 
and flexible system designs such as graphical applications, logistics, transportation, search engines, 
network management etc [33]. 
Mobile Agent Systems can be divided based into programming language by which they are developed 
and use: Java and non-Java based. Around 85% of Mobile Agent systems available today are built 
using Java, due to its inherent support to Mobile Agent programming [19].   
Mobile Agents are becoming a focus of modern research because of their applications in distributed 
systems which are replacing traditional client-server architectures rapidly [34].  However, one of the 
key concerns in practical implementation of Mobile Agent is the lack of protection against any threats.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work is provided in Section 2. Section 3 provides 
the security issues that a Mobile Agent can counter while visiting another host in the network. We will 
discuss Sketch data structure to provide grained analysis and to derive probability distributions and  
will introduce different divergence measures (Hellinger Distance and Chi-square divergence) in order 
to compare their performance if a flooding attack happens on a Mobile Agent Network, in Section 4. 
Section 5 describes our proposed approach design.   In Section 6, we present our experimental works 
and check the capability, reaction and performance of the mobile agents based on the developed 
design. Finally in Section 7, we present the conclusion and our future work. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
From one side several researches have been proposed security solutions to detect and prevent attacks in 
real traffic. Most of these proposed solutions emphasize on many different detection and prevention 
strategies. 
SYN flooding attack detection has been an interested issue for security researchers. The authors in [2] 
present the effects of correlation analysis on the DDoS detection. They propose a covariance analysis 
method for detecting SYN flooding attacks. 
Existing methods for anomaly detection are based on different techniques, such as Haar-wavelet 
analysis [3], [4], Entropy based method [5] and Holt-Winters [6] seasonal forecasting method. Authors 
in [7] compare two different algorithms (CUSUM and adaptive threshold) for the detection of SYN 
flooding attack. They conclude that CUSUM performs better then adaptive threshold in terms of 
detection accuracy of low intensity attacks. However, both of these algorithms face problems of false 
alarm ratio under normal IP traffic variation.  
Other work aggregates the whole traffic in one time series, and applies a change point detection 
algorithm to detect the instant of anomaly occurrence. The latter has a good performance in terms of 
spatial and temporal complexities, but presents the drawback of aggregating all traffic in one flow, 
where low intensity attacks cannot be detected. Furthermore, these methods use static threshold for 
detecting anomalies, which is not adequate with traffic variations, and may induce false alarm and miss 
detection. 
Sketch data structure uses the random aggregation for more grained analysis than aggregating the 
whole traffic in one time series. It has been used to summarize monitored traffic in a fixed memory, 
and to provide scalable input for time series analysis. Authors in [8] propose the use of CUmulative 
SUM (CUSUM) over the sketch for network anomaly detection. Furthermore, they propose a new 
mechanism for Sketch inversion and malicious flows identification. We will exploit the Sketch data 
structure to derive probability distributions. 
In addition, recent work experiments the histogram-based detector in order to detect the anomaly 
behaviors and changes in traffic distributions [9]. They apply Kullback-Leibler divergence between the 
current and previous measurement distributions. 
Authors in [10] apply Hellinger distance (HD) on Sketch data structure, in order to detect divergence 
between current and previous distributions of the number of SIP INVITE request. In fact, HD must be 
near zero when probability distributions are similar, and it increases up to one whenever the 
distributions diverges (e.g. under Invite flooding attacks). In addition, they used the dynamic threshold 
proposed in [11] during their experimental analysis. 
 
From other side, several researches have been conducted over mobile Agents. 
Some Articles showed what exactly it is makes Java such a powerful tool for mobile agent 
development, also it highlighted some shortcomings in Java language systems that have implications 
for the conceptual design and use of Java-based mobile agent systems [19],[20].Some studies 
concentrate their work on the fault tolerance techniques in mobile agents, network management 
applications based on mobile agent technologies and how the fault tolerance techniques can improve 
their performance [25], [26]. 
Other articles worked on an agent-based intelligent mobile assistant for supporting users prior to and 
during the execution of their tasks [27]. 
In addition, some works have been performed to integrate the mobile agents with the e-commerce. 
Some technical relevant issues are well presented [28], [29], [30].   
Some researches concentrated their work on security concerns (i.e masquerading, denial of service, 
unauthorized access and repudiation) of mobile agents and how to protect them by several techniques 
like for example providing logical framework designed to support large-scale heterogeneous mobile 
agent applications, on safe code interpretation, digital signatures, path histories, State Appraisal and 
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [21], [22],[23],[24] 
 
Our research combines the mobile agents and the detection methods. It emphasizes on how a mobile 
agent can detect a flooding attacks. We develop a general framework that increases the detection 
accuracy and reduces the false alarm by integrating different divergence measures over Sketch 
technique in a Mobile Agent world. 
 
In this paper, we will provide a brief about the security threats that a mobile agent can counter while 
hosting other hosts in the network in section 3. We will discuss Sketch data structure to provide grained 
analysis and to derive probability distributions and  will introduce different divergence measures 
(Hellinger Distance and Chi-square divergence) in order to compare their performance if a flooding 
attack happens on a Mobile Agent Network, in Section 4. Section 5 describes our proposed approach 
design.  In Section 6, we present our experimental works and check the capability, reaction and 
performance of the mobile agents based on the developed design. Finally in Section 7, we present the 
conclusion and our future work. 
 
 
3. MOBILE AGENTS SECURITY THREATS AND 
COUNTERMEASURES 
Security is one of the key factors of MAS. In fact, a MA is one of the potential threats to computer 
systems and vice versa, from the host system to the MAS itself. In this part, we will talk about the main 
security issues related to MAS. 
The security threats for MASs could be divided as follows:  
 IP spoofing: consists of sending packets with a faked IP source address. The server should 
believe that the packets come from another host, probably a host that is allowed to establish 
connections with the attacked host, if the real one is not allowed 
 Sniffing: it is the observation and analysis of network traffic in order to obtain relevant 
information (such as IP addresses and host functionalities) to perform other attacks. 
 UDP flood attack: this kind of flooding attack consist on sending many UDP packets to 
different port of a target in random way. This target will check if there's any application on the 
relevant port, if not, he will be occupied to send ICMP replies and can't treat requests from 
legitimate clients. 
 SYN flood attack: it consist on sending many TCP connection requests to a target. This latter 
will accept the establishment of the connection and notify the client. Except that, this one will 
never use them. Thereby, the server will be drown by unused connections and, eventually, will 
not reply to legitimate users requests. 
There are many security services that can be used for securing the agents systems, for example; 
authentication, integrity, confidentiality and authorization. 
In case of the authentication, the host needs to know the sender of the delivered agent. The agent 
authentication process includes verifying the entity that programmed the agent and also verifying the 
entity that dispatched it to the host. Basically, the agent and the host need to know with whom they are 
talking and dealing with, here the public-key encryption or passwords can be used,. 
For integrity, checking the integrity of the agents is a technique that makes sure no one has made any 
changes to the agents, the agents travelling form on host to another, and communicates and exchanges 
their data with other hosts and other agents. In this case, we need to make sure that the agents have not 
been tampered with in relation to their state, code or data. Moreover, the agents could carry different 
types of data, for example some private data. These data should only be readable from a specific host 
or agents. This technique is very important to avoid an eavesdropping threat. The last service which 
helps to protect the agents and the hosts is authorization; the incoming agents should have a specific 
right to access the host information, so different agents have different authority, to protect the hosts and 
also to protect themselves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. THEORITICAL BACKGROUND 
4.1.  Sketch technique 
In this section, we review the K-ary Sketch data structure. Using Sketch data structure makes our 
framework flexible and scalable for grained analysis. No matter how many flows exist in the traffic, 
Sketch generates fixed-number of time series [3], [4] for anomaly detection. Sketch provides more 
grained analysis than aggregating whole traffic in one time series. 
The Sketch data structure is used for dimensionality reduction. It is based on random aggregation of 
traffic attribute (e.g. number of packets) in different hash tables. A Sketch S is a 2D array of H × K cell 
(as shown in Figure 1), where K is the size of the hash table, and H is the number of mutual 
independent hash functions (universal hash functions). Each item is identified by a key κn and 
associated with a reward value νn. For each new arriving item (κn, νn), the associated value will be 
added to the cell S[i][j], where i is an index used to represent the hash function associated with ith hash 
table (0 ≤ i ≤ d − 1), and j is the hash value (j = hi(κn)) of the key by the ith hash function. 
Data items, whose keys are hashed to the same value, will be aggregated in the same cell in the hash 
table, and their values will be added up to existing counter in the hash table. Each hash table (or each 
row) is used to derive probability distribution as the ratio of the counter in each cell to the sum of 
whole cell in the line. The derived probability distributions (we get K probability set, one per line) are 
used as inputs for  divergence measures 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Sketch Data structure 
4.2 Divergence Measures 
These measures are used to detect the DDoS attacks based on the deviation of traffic distribution. In 
fact, the idea is to compare the prior distribution derived from Sketch counters in previous time slot, 
with the currently obtained distribution. One can use this change to detect flooding attack, because the 
counter of one cell will increase significantly with the number of sent requests, and the probability 
distribution deviates at the start and stop instants of the flooding attack. 
 
4.2.1. Hellinger Distance (HD) 
 
Hellinger Distance (HD) is used to measure the divergence between two sets of probability values.  
For two discrete probability distributions P = (P0, P1….,Pk−1) and Q = (Q0, Q1,…,Qk−1), with Pi ≥ 0, 
Qi ≥ 0 and  
 
 
The HD between current distribution P and prior distribution Q is defined as:  
 
Where HD satisfies the inequality 0 ≤ HD (P, Q) ≤ 1, and HD (P, Q) = 0 if P = Q. HD is a symmetric 
distance (e.g.  HD (P, Q) = HD (Q, P)), and induces two spikes, one at the beginning of change, and the 
second at the end of the change, [18]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2.  Chi-square divergence 
χ2 divergence is used to measure distance between two discrete probability distributions (P and Q). For 
2 probability sets P = (p1, p2, p3. . . pn) and  Q = (q1, q2, q3. . . qn), with Pi ≥ 0, Qi ≥ 0 & 
           
The Pearson χ2 divergence between P and Q is given by: 
 
Where Q is the estimated probability distribution and P is the measured probability distribution, and χ2 
(P||Q) is the distance between distributions P and Q. 
For hypothesis testing, such as H0 (normal traffic hypothesis) and H1 (traffic with anomalies), χ2 
values can run from zero into infinity. χ2 will be zero if P and Q are identical (Pi = Qi) under 
hypothesis H0, and χ2 increases as the distributions become dissimilar, and eventually so high 
(infinity) when the two distributions are independent (P ≠ Q)under hypothesis H1. It is important to 
note that χ2 divergence is nonnegative and the division 0/0 is treated as 0, and the division by zero is 
replaced by a very small value ε . 
The χ2 divergence between 2 probability distributions P and Q must be near zero under normal traffic, 
with a large deviation (one spike) when distributions change occurs. χ2 is asymmetric (χ2 (P||Q) ≠ χ2 
(Q||P)), and its symmetric version  raises two spikes.  One spike at the beginning and the second at the 
end of the attack. 
                
We intend to use Pearson chi-square divergence (asymmetric) to detect anomaly through the detection 
of deviations from normal traffic profile, and we will modify the input time series to constrain χ2 to 
raise alarms (spikes) for the whole duration of attack. In [30], authors prove that χ2 divergence behaves 
better than all classical divergences (Hellinger distance, Kullback-Leibler, Likelihood, etc, [6]. 
 
 
5. PROPOSED APPROACH 
The proposed approach for anomaly detection in Mobile Agent networks is based on Sketch and 
divergence measures (Hellinger Distance and Chi-square) 
The detection system records the number of monitored point (e.g. #packets, #SYN, #flows, etc.) in the 
Sketch for each discrete time interval T. Random aggregation of traffic flows in Sketch is the first step 
of our processing, followed by time series forecasting with divergence measures (Figure. 2). 
 
 
Figure 2 : Architecture of the proposed approach for network anomaly detection. 
During each interval, the destination IP address (DIP), for each packet containing a SYN segment, is 
hashed by H hash functions. The resulted hash value by the ith function (j = hi(DIP)) is used as index 
of the associated counter Si,j with DIP. Each arriving SYN segment increments the associated counter.  
Our analysis will be focused on TCP SYN flooding by counting the number of SYN. 
At the end of each epoch T, we derive probability distributions from Sketch. First, we get the sum of 
the counter in each line, and the probability pi,j in each cell is calculated as the ratio of each counter to 
the total number of SYN: 
 
Each cell Si,j becomes a data structure, that contains: current counter, current and previous 
probabilities. Therefore, each line (or hash table) provides two probability distributions: the first one is 
from previous interval and used as reference distribution Qi. The second one is from current interval Pi, 
and used to measure the divergence from the reference distribution, in order to detect anomalies. 
Divergence measures between the current (Pi) and reference probability (Qi) distributions is calculated 
for each line in the Sketch, at the end of each time interval (i.e. at n.T ). During malicious activities, the 
divergence measure D(Pi||Qi) produces spikes, and when more than L (L < H) divergences resulted 
from different hash tables exceed a dynamic threshold, an alarm is raised. 
To detect deviations in the time series resulted from divergence measures, we derive a subsequent time 
series containing the values of D(Pi||Qi) without spikes. In this last time series (without large values), 
we define a dynamic bound of μi+ασi. Significant deviations are larger than the dynamic bound: 
                                                                    
Where D(Pi||Qi) is the divergence measure in the time interval n.T for the ith line in the Sketch, and μi 
& σi are the mean and the standard deviation respectively of smoothed time series that doesn’t contain 
spikes (D^(Pi||Qi)). μi and σi are updated dynamically using the Exponentially Weighted Moving 
Average (EWMA): 
 
 
+(1-  
 
The threshold is updated dynamically with the value of μi and σi as shown in above equations. α is a 
parameter used for calibrating the sensitivity of the detection algorithm to variations. It is also used to 
reduce the false alarm rate. Under normal traffic, divergence D (Pi||Qi) falls inside the bound of μi + 
2σi. When D (Pi||Qi) exceeds the dynamically updated threshold over L lines, an alarm is triggered. 
 
6. EXPERIMENTAL WORKS 
In this section, we present the performance analysis results for integrating divergence measures over 
Sketch, for detecting SYN flooding attacks in a mobile agent network.  As we want to compare 2 
divergence measures (HD & χ2) over Sketch for the detection of flooding attacks, we will implement a 
mobile agent network. 
For the sake of simplicity, we focus our analysis on the detection of TCP SYN flooding attacks, as it is 
the widely used attack for DDoS in these days. 
 
6.1 DATASET 
The following techniques and tools are used: Two workstations with 8 GB and 768 MB of RAM 
respectively, which run Windows Server 2003 and a number of Mobile Agents are used.  
We have considered the above describe mobile agents will have to execute the similar path. To 
measure the capability of the proposal towards eavesdropping threat, a test environment is set up using 
the above mentioned computers as shown in Figure 3. Computer A is considered to act as trusted server 
(TS) and computer B runs many host nodes simulated through various port numbers as well as the 
home node in a virtualized mode. Ethereal will be running regularly over computer A. its job is to 
collect packets in the mobile agent network and store them for a period of 4h00 from 18/02/2017 
07h30 to 11h30. These traces are used to test the efficiency of divergence measures. IP addresses in the 
traces are scrambled by a modified version of tcpdriv tool, but correlation between addresses are 
conserved. We analyze these 8h30 traces using Sketch data structure, with a key of the Sketch (κn = 
DIP), and a reward vn = 1 for SYN request only, and vn = 0 otherwise. We set the Sketch width K to 
1024, and the number of hash H to 5. 
  
 
Figure 3: Experimental Lab 
 
Afterward, we inject 12 real distributed SYN flooding attacks with different intensity inside this trace. 
These attacks are inserted each 30 minutes (on instants t=30, 61, 90, 127,157,187, etc.) and span for 10 
minutes. These different intensity attacks are shown in Figure 4. The first attack begins with a value of 
900 SYN/min and decreases until 280 SYN/min. 
 
 
Figure 4 : SYN flooding Attacks 
 
Figure 5 & Figure 6 show the variation of total number of mobile agents’ packets before and after the 
injection of SYN flooding attacks. By comparing these variations, we might not notice the differences 
between both figures without deep inspection. Inserted attacks don’t induce heavy deviations in the 
time series of the total number of SYN requests. This can be explained by the fact that the intensity of 
SYN flooding attacks is not large compared to the intensity of the total number of SYN segments. In 
such cases, the detection of attacks is very challenging, because no heavy changes in the time series 
describing the variations of the total number of SYN, and the intensity of the SYN flooding attacks  is 
buried by the large number of SYN (as shown in Fig. 4) before attacks injection. 
 
6.2 Evaluation Strategy 
In this section, we present the evaluation results of the application of these divergence measures on the 
mobile agent IP traces. 
First, we begin our analysis by applying HD & χ2 divergence over the traces (before attacks injection). 
We set the dynamic threshold as given in Eq. 5. We will begin our analysis by applying the HD and 
Chi-Square over the mobile agent IP traces (before injection SYN flooding attacks). Figure 7 & Figure 
8 show the variation of these 2 divergence algorithms as well as the dynamic threshold (dashed line) 
before the injection of attacks. When the value of divergence measures is larger than threshold in at 
least 3 hash tables in the Sketch, an alarm is triggered. We see that both algorithms were able to detect 
anomalies at different time (t=90, 127,157,180 etc.).  These anomalies are temporary and they don’t 
persist more than many minutes. However, there are more anomalies that can be detected by using the 
source IP address as the key of the Sketch, but we will restrict our analysis to SYN flooding attacks. In 
fact, after the manual verification of traces, we found that HD triggers 4 false alarms, and the χ2 
divergence achieves very high detection accuracy with 1 false alarm. 
Indeed, we continue our analysis by applying the HD and Chi-Square over the mobile agent IP traces 
(after injection SYN flooding attacks). We noticed that in case of Hellinger Distance using a dynamic 
threshold, we obtain 4 false alarms with a detection of 100% (Figure 9).  However, in the case of Chi-
Square, we did not obtain any false alarm (Figure 10). We found through our conducted experiments 
that Chi-square divergence performs better than HD in terms of reducing false alarm, with less effort 
for tuning the dynamic threshold. The intensity of raised spikes in Chi-square increases with the 
intensity of attacks and dynamic threshold becomes useless. 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
Figure 5 : Total number of mobile agents’ packets Figure 6 : Total number of mobile agents’ packets after 
SYN flooding attacks injection 
 
Figure 7 : Hellinger Distance before attacks Figure 8 : Chi-square before attacks 
Figure 10 : Chi-square after attacks Figure 9 : Hellinger Distance after attacks 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we analyzed the accuracy of 2 divergence measures (HD & Chi-square divergence) over 
Sketch data structure for network anomaly detection. We compared their performances in terms of true 
positive and false alarm ratio, over real mobile agents IP traces with injected real distributed SYN 
flooding attacks at known instants. 
Afterward, we used dynamic threshold for achieving the best tradeoff between false alarm and true 
detection.  
We found that HD performs a good detection, but with higher false alarm ratio than Chi-square 
divergence.  We can conclude that Chi-square conducts better detection than HD for mobile agents’ 
network. Furthermore, the intensity of triggered spikes by Chi-square divergence increases 
significantly with the intensity of attacks. It is important to note that these divergence measures with 
Sketch are computationally efficient for handling traffic on mobile agents’ traffic. 
In our future work, we will introduce another divergence measure which is Power Divergence in order 
to compare its performance on the detection of flooding attacks over mobile agents with Chi-square 
and Hellinger Distance. In addition, we will focus on providing additional information to pinpoint 
malicious flows, in order to trigger automatic reaction against ongoing attacks. We also intend to 
provide a method for reducing the amount of monitoring data on mobile agents networks, and to 
analyze the impact of sampling on the precision of this divergence measure. 
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